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City of West Palm Beach v. Cowart, 241 So. 2d 748 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970)
In a wrongful death action based on a theory of attractive nuisance, plaintiff recovered a judgment of 20,000 dollars for the death of his minor son.
On appeal the defendant raised, for the first time, the defense that the
plaintiff did not have standing to sue because the deceased child was illegitimate. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court and
HELD, the father of an illegitimate child does not have standing to sue for
his minor son's wrongful death.'
The Florida wrongful death statute allows parents to sue for the wrongful death of their minor child,2 a right of action unknown at common law. 3
This right of action is personal to the parents and cannot be brought in
the name of the legal representative, executor, or administrator of the decedent child's estate.4 Only damages for the loss of the minor child's services
and for mental pain and suffering are recoverable.5
Originally, this provision of the wrongful death statute was construed
by the courts to vest the right to maintain the action solely in the father. 6
The mother could sue only if the father were deceased 7 or presumed dead. s
In recent years, however, this standard has been relaxed by allowing a divorced mother who had custody of the child to bring an action9 and by
allowing adoptive parents the same rights as natural parents. 10 More recently
the courts have held the right to bring an action does not depend upon
legal custody of the child when the natural parents are separated or divorced.1' Both parents may bring an action to recover mental pain and suffering, but only the parents supporting the child may recover for loss of
services.12

1. 241 So. 2d 748, 752 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970). The court also held that since the
defense raised by the defendant was a fundamental error, it could be raised for the first
time on appeal.
2. FLA. STAT. §768.03 (1969), provides in part: " (1) Whenever the death of any minor
child shall be caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any individual .. . the father of such minor child, or if the father be not living, the mother
may maintain an action against such individual . . . and may recover, not only for the
loss of services of such minor child, but in addition thereto, such sum for the mental pain
and suffering of the parent (or both parents) if they survive, as the jury may assess. (2)
The right of action as set forth in subsection (1) shall extend to and include actions ex
contractu and ex delicto."
3. Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 597, 88 So. 601, 603 (1921).
4. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Moseley, 60 Fla. 186, 189, 53 So. 718, 719 (1910).
5. FLA. STAT. §768.03 (1) (1969); see note 2 supra.
6. Mock v. Evans Light & Ice Co., 88 Fla. 133, 136, 101 So. 203, 204 (1924).
7. Id.
8. Baker v. Peavy-Wison Lumber Co., 140 Fla. 791, 793, 192 So. 192, 193 (1939).
9. Haddock v. Florida Motor Lines Corp., 150 Fla. 848, 851, 9 So. 2d 98, 100 (1942).
10. City of St. Petersburg v. Jaeck, 79 Fla. 694, 84 So. 622 (1920).
11. Williams v. Legree, 206 So. 2d 13, 15 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
12. Id.
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In the instant case the court based its decision primarily on the established
common law principle that only the mother can maintain an action for
the death of an illegitimate child.13 The original decision establishing this
principle was rendered in 1914 and was predicated upon an analogy between
a Florida probate statute and the wrongful death statute.1 4 The specific
inheritance statute recognized the mother's parentage in the illegitimate
child, but not the father's. The court reasoned that since the legislature
had acknowledged the mother's inheritance rights in the illegitimate child,
she should also have rights under the wrongful death statute.18 Likewise,
since the father of an illegitimate child had not been recognized by the
legislature, the court reasoned he should occupy the same status as the deceased father of a legitimate child.Y. This construction vested in the mother
alone the right to maintain an action.' s
In addition to the common law principles involved in the instant case,
the court was presented with the question of whether the United States
Supreme Court decisions of Levy v. Louisiana'9 and Glona v. American Guarantee &cLiability Insurance Co. 2o were applicable to the father-child relationship. In Levy a suit was brought by illegitimate children under the Louisiana wrongful death statute to recover for the death of their mother. The Supreme Court held that illegitimate children are persons within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment and that to bar the children's recovery simply
because they were illegitimate would be invidious discrimination and a denial of equal protection.21 In Glona a mother sued for the wrongful death

15. See, e.g., Hadley v. City of Tallahassee, 67 Fla. 436, 65 So. 545 (1914).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 437, 65 So. at 545. The statute, Fla. Gen. Stat. §2292 (1906), provided:
"Bastards shall be capable of inheriting or transmitting inheritance on the part of their
mother in like manner as if they had been lawfully begotten of such mother."
16. Hadley v. City of Tallahassee, 67 Fla. 436, 65 So. 545 (1914). Under English common
law illegitimates were considered nullius fillius, or without parents. Since the parents were
not recognized as such, no one could meet the statutory requirements of recovery.
17. Id. at 438, 65 So. at 545, the court said: "In so far as bastards are concerned, they
have no fathers recognized as such by any law; but as to them and the right of their
mothers to recover for their wrongful death under this statute, they occupy the same
status before the law as a legitimate child whose legally recognized father was actually
dead."
18. FLA. STAT. §768.03 (1969), provides in part: "Or if the father be not living, the
mother may maintain an action ....: Since the decision in Hadley, the mother's rights
in the illegitimate have been further recognized in Florida by statute and case decision.
FLA. STAT. §744.13 (l) (1969), provides in part: "The mother of an illegitimate child is the
natural guardian of such child." FLA. STAT. §731.29 (1969), provides in part: "(1) Every
illegitimate child is an heir of his mother .... (2) If any illegitimate child dies intestate,
without lawful issue or spouse, his estate shall descend to his mother...
The Florida
supreme court in In re Whetstone, 137 Fla. 712, 716, 188 So. 576, 578 (1939), held that
the mother of an illegitimate child must be given notice of adoption proceedings, and
in dicta the court stated: "The law is well settled that the mother of an illegitimate child
has all the parental rights of other parents .....
19. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
20. 391 US.73 (1968).
21. Levy v. Louisiana, 591.U.S. 68, 70, 72 (1968).
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of her illegitimate child. The Court held that since there was no rational
basis for the state to make distinctions based on legitimacy of birth, to bar
recovery because the child was illegitimate would be a denial of equal protection.22
In the instant case, the court strictly interpreted the Levy and Glona decisions and determined: "The holdings do not touch on the efficacy of a
claim involving the father of an illegitimate child." 2 3 Thus, the court did
not reach the constitutional question of whether the distinction between
the mother and father of an illegitimate child violates the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Although the state is generally given considerable discretion in applying
social and economic legislation, 24 the constitutional test under the fourteenth
amendment is whether, under the circumstances, the classification made by
the state is rational. 25 Two theories have been advanced as a rational basis
for the distinction between the mother and father of an illegitimate. First,
the state has a valid interest in encouraging marriage and discouraging promiscuity. 26 The Supreme Court in Glona recognized this as a legitimate
interest of the state but declared: "We see no rational basis for assuming
that if the natural mother is allowed possible recovery . . . the cause of illegitimacy will be served. " 2 7 This reasoning would not appear to lose its
validity simply because it is the father who seeks ,to recover.
Second, this distinction between the mother and father of an illegitimate
has been supported by arguments based on the difficulty of proving the
father's paternity. 28 The Supreme Court in Glona recognized the problem
of proof in relation to the mother but held this went to the burden of proof
rather than to the substantive right to maintain an action.29 Proof of paternity would perhaps be more burdensome, but in any event the father should
be required to prove paternity and if he failed in the burden, recovery
would not be allowed. 0 Thus, paternity should be viewed not as a substantive
question but merely as a matter of proof.
The Supreme Court of Florida has granted certiorari to the plaintiff in the
instant case.8' On review, serious questions could be raised concerning the
basis of this decision. The common law principle underlying this decision
was based upon a 1914 interpretation of the wrongful death statute by an
analogy to a 1906 inheritance statute. 32 This statute has been replaced by
22. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 76 (1968).
23. 241 So. 2d at 751.
24. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
26. Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968); see Krause,
Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-First Decisions on Equal
.Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CM. L. REv. 338 (1969).
27. 391 U.S. at 75.
28. Krause, supra note 26, at 349.
29. 391 U.S. at 76.
30. Krause, supra note 26, at 344, 349.

31. Cert. granted, by order. FLA. App. R. 4.5c (6).
32. Hadley v. City of Tallahassee, 67 Fla. 436, 65 So. 545 (1914); see text accompanying
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a statute that gives the illegitimate child a right of inheritance from the
father under certain conditions.33 Clearly, the state has a valid interest in
intestate distribution of property, 84 but wrongful death is not concerned
with competing rights of heirs but with the personal pecuniary injury suffered by the plaintiff.- His recovery will not diminish the proportionate
share of someone else or burden the distribution of property within the
state.3 6
The constitutional basis of the instant court's decision is questionable.
The distinction between the mother and father of an illegitimate appears
to be an irrational classification in violation of the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment. This distinction has its roots not in logic or reason, but in
37
history.
In addition, the court completely ignored the factual situation. According
to the plaintiff's petition for certiorari the mother abandoned the child and
his father two months after birth. 38 The plaintiff reared, supported, and
acknowledged the child since infancy.39 Thus, the court has denied recovery
to the person most injured by the boy's death. In any event, the practical
effect of this decision is to deny any recovery for 'the child's wrongful death
since at the time of this decision the statute of limitations had run on the
mother's claim.40
The Supreme Court of Florida expressed a more rational approach thirtynine years ago when it said: "When the reason for a rule has passed, the
rule itself should no longer stand, and a new rule in harmony with changed
conditions should be recognized." 41 In the instant case the Florida courts
should apply this philosophy rather than rely merely on history and precedent. The Florida wrongful death statute creates a right in the parents of a
minor child. There is no valid reason the courts should allow recovery
to the natural mother of an illegitimate but deny that same right to the
natural father.

DAvm F. CROW

notes 15-18 supra.
33. R.-. STAT. §751.29 (1) (1969), provides in part: "Every illegitimate child is an heir
. . . of the person who, in writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness,
acknowledges himself to be the father."
54. See Strahan v. Strahan, 504 F. Supp. 40 (W.D. La. 1969); In re Estate of Caldwell,
247 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971), where the court upheld the Florida probate statute concerning

illegitimates against attacks that it denied equal protection; Burnett v. Camden, - Ind. -,
254 N.E.2d 199 (1970). In re Estate of Pakarinen, 287 Minn. 330, 178 N.W.2d 714 (1970).
'35. In re Estate of Ortiz, 503 N.Y.S.2d 806, 813 (Sur. Ct. 1969).
86.

Id.

57. Krause, supra note 26, at 349.
58. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5, Cowart v. City of West Palm Beach,

-

So. 2d

(Fla. 1971).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 6. FLA. STAT. §768.04 (1969) provides for a two-year statute of limitations
on claims for wrongful death of a minor child.
41. Waller v. First Say. & Trust Co., 103 Fla. 1025, 1038, 158 So. 780, 785 (1932).
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